New Year, New Horizons
Challenges and Opportunities for Israel in the Region
BY DR. PNINA SHUKER
BY COLONEL (RES.) DR. ERAN LERMAN
The “Iron Swords” War – the name Israel gave to the multidimensional conflict in which it found itself after the October 7th massacre – has yet to end, but it has already created a series of tectonic shifts in the Middle East. While the ongoing fighting in Gaza and the humanitarian distress there have long-term negative implications, other aspects – above all, the successful blows dealt to Iran and its proxies – also present considerable opportunities for Israel. Given the current American administration’s explicit commitment to expanding normalization and the relief felt by Arab nations when the “12-Day War” set back the Iranian nuclear project and halved its ballistic missile capabilities, these may yet be translated into closer strategic cooperation among the forces of stability in the region.
The combined action by Israel and America not only struck Iranian nuclear facilities and project leaders and severely disrupted the senior command and control of the Revolutionary Guard and the army, but also exposed the weakness of Iran and its allies and their empty bluster, which had intimidated the region for years. Back in September 2024, Israel inflicted severe damage on Hezbollah and decapitated the organization’s top leadership and capabilities, and Hezbollah’s utter silence during the 12-Day War – the very purpose for which it was armed – speaks volumes. Israel then played an indirect role in hastening the fall of Assad’s regime, eliminating Syrian military capabilities, and had full freedom over Syrian skies. The regional players took note.
Yet Israel cannot rest on its laurels. Iran, though weakened, will seek to re-emerge as an existential threat. Internationally, the operation’s achievements must be leveraged to create enforcement mechanisms, whether by diplomacy or by force. Regionally, Arab fear of Iran and appreciation for Israeli capabilities can lead to broad cooperation, strengthening existing relationships and adding new ones.
Significantly, in the five years since the Abraham Accords, they have consistently proved their resilience despite the war’s vicissitudes. Neither the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain or Morocco downgraded their diplomatic representations. In some respects, the trade and even military cooperation ties (specifically with Morocco) grew closer.
Future normalization and regional dynamics
Given Israel’s effective action against the common enemy – Iran – eyes have been on normalization with Saudi Arabia. Beyond the economic and strategic benefits, this could pave the way for establishing relations between Israel and additional Muslim and Arab countries. The two countries were on a positive trajectory before the October 7th attack, which was to some extent intended to thwart this rapprochement. While full normalization will await the ending of the war in Gaza and a future – currently unlikely – expression of willingness to contemplate a two-state solution, much can be done in the meantime to improve relations.
As for Egypt and Jordan, both fear the consequences of the war, are committed to the Palestinian issue, and publicly condemn Israel for alleged war crimes, but at the same time, they do not want to see Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood empowered. The threat of Iranian-sponsored subversion in Jordan strengthens covert cooperation with Israel, despite virulent public anger due to the Gaza war. Jordan even lent assistance to the international coalition that helped thwart Iranian attacks in April and October 2024. Egypt also faces sharp internal rebuke of its Israel policy but resisted pressure to renege on the 1979 Peace Treaty or allow provocative “convoys” through to Gaza. However, any attempt to push the Gazan population over the border would be deemed a serious threat to Egyptian national security and would lead to a confrontation.
Strategic opportunities on the northern front
It is yet too early to tell if the war’s achievements during 2024 will indeed generate strategic opportunities for Israel to stabilize its borders with Lebanon and Syria. Since the ceasefire in the north came into effect on November 24, 2024, Hezbollah has been in severe economic distress. Following the appointment of President Joseph Aoun and the formation of the new government led by Nawaf Salam, Israel and the new Lebanese leadership share a convergence of interests: maintaining the ceasefire and preventing Hezbollah’s recovery, both militarily and within the internal Lebanese system. The American demand for Hezbollah’s disarmament has not been met – but nor has it been dismissed out of hand. It is understood to be a precondition for economic aid to the country, cessation of IDF attacks, and IDF withdrawal from Lebanon. Moreover, a proposal for a gradual normalization agreement with Israel is also on the Lebanese leadership’s table. The organization’s duress, combined with Iran’s reduced situation after the 12-Day war, creates a window of opportunity for Israel to stabilize its border.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024, was a historical turning point for Syria. Russia’s entanglement in Ukraine and the collapse of Hezbollah as significant support hastened the collapse of a rotten regime. The new Syrian government, led by Ahmed al-Shara (aka Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), quickly positioned itself as the official authority and tried to project an image of moderation, bringing stability to the fractured country. It is indeed busy blocking Iran’s attempts to smuggle weapons to Lebanon – given Hezbollah’s role in sustaining Assad in power – and reducing the activity of Palestinian factions in the country.
However, the new regime has yet to gain real control over the armed factions operating in its name, as the massacres against the Druze have shown. To prevent the entrenchment of hostile forces near its border, Israel occupied a buffer zone on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, maintains freedom of action over the country, and intervened forcefully on behalf of the Druze.
But while normalization with Syria is still far off, the US (which lifted sanctions on Syria) did curb Israel’s actions and then arranged for an open meeting between the Syrian FM and Israel’s Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, Netanyahu’s alter ego. This can lead to a stable security agreement between the countries. Quiet Israeli involvement in Syria’s rehabilitation from utter ruin, in partnership with Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, could be the first steps in building trust.
The lingering Palestinian question
Amidst all this, even if Israel’s Arab partners resist public pressures to renege on their agreements with Israel, the Palestinian issue in general, and the Gaza issue in particular, will continue to overshadow all relations with Israel. It remains the central obstacle to expanding normalization with additional countries. Arab countries are united in their desire to end the war in Gaza and in their opposition to the “Trump plan” for Gaza: they vaguely support the Egyptian proposal for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, rejecting any forced migration. The Arab League’s adoption of the Egyptian proposal on May 17, 2025, underscores this. The exacerbation of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, along with the continuation of the war, may exhaust Arab and international patience.
Recognizing the magnitude of the strategic hour and the persistent threat of Iran and its proxies, regional partnerships need to be harnessed to establish a mechanism for ending the war in Gaza, expanding normalization, and leveraging military achievements into political gains.
Dr. Pnina Shuker is a research fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. She is an expert in national security, public opinion, and foreign policy issues.
Colonel (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman is deputy head of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.